Nations and Regions: Dynamics of devolution - Northern Ireland
by Rick Wilford
The outcome immediately turned the spotlight on Alliance and a former party leader, Lord Alderdice, the speaker. Following the vote, he chose to adjourn the sitting rather than suspend it and left for a weekend visit to France. This meant that it would prove impossible to reconvene the assembly on Saturday to rerun the vote.
The situation was high-pressure not least because at midnight on Saturday, November 3rd the six-week period following the Northern Ireland secretary's second 24-hour suspension was due to expire. It was assumed that, at that point, he would again have to decide whether to suspend the assembly or dissolve it and set a date for a fresh election. Northern Ireland was on the verge of a political twilight zone. Following intense meetings during Friday and Saturday with Dr Reid, phone calls between the recently elected Alliance leader, David Ford, and the prime minister, Mr Blair, and hastily convened discussions with other pro-agreement parties, the Alliance's executive agreed that it would redesignate three of its five members as 'unionists'.
There was, however, a quid pro quo - further amendment to standing orders providing for subsequent redesignation within seven days, and an undertaking from the UK government to review the voting arrangements in the assembly. The latter would require revisiting the Northern Ireland Act 1998, possibly providing for the abandonment of the designation procedure and the adoption of a new, and purely numerical, weighted majority for 'key decisions'. That, however, would likely upset the SDLP and SF, both of which understand the existing provisions as a safeguard against unionist domination (though in fact they merely assist the unionist 'no' camp).
An alternative would require MLAs to register along another axis - for instance, as 'pro' or 'anti-agreement', and to reapply the current tests (parallel consent or weighted majority) on that basis. One other notional option - simple-majority voting - would be unacceptable to nationalists and republicans.
Alliance and the Women's Coalition do have a point. On all key decisions, the votes of those designated as 'others' do not count in the sense that they are excluded from the tests of cross-community support. On those matters, only unionists and nationalists need apply - or, rather, troop through the division lobbies. The review of the internal 'strand one' of the agreement, including voting procedures in the chamber, was to begin on November 19th.
A cloud of uncertainty still hung over what the secretary of state would do at one minute to midnight on November 3rd. The decision by Alliance to redesignate created the prospect of a successful election of first and deputy first ministers on the Monday, November 5th. In the event he did nothing.
This prompted the DUP to apply to the High Court for a judicial review of Dr Reid's non-decision. In its view, the failure to elect a first and deputy first minister within the six-week period obliged the Northern Ireland secretary, under the 1998 act, to dissolve the assembly and set a date for an election. The DUP's application was, however, rejected on the ground that while the failure to elect did oblige him to call an election, he enjoyed considerable latitude in deciding to do so and in setting a date. In effect, the rulling enables Dr Reid to avoid an election until May 2003, the date envisaged in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. |
