Issue Hierarchies in Peace Processes: The Decommissioning of Paramilitary Arms and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Lessons for Ending Civil Conflicts
by Roger Mac Ginty
More fundamentally, positions on the issue reflected a lack of trust among the talks participants. For Irish Prime Minister, John Bruton, 'It all boils down to a matter of trust' (75). According to UUP leader, David Trimble,
The reality is that unionists, after 25 years of bombing and shooting, do not trust IRA/Sinn Fein and will not sit down to discuss any constitutional proposals, so long as IRA/Sinn Fein have the ability to leave the table and begin murdering again when they do not get their way.
Thus, the question is one of confidence and trust, and not of whether one gun or 200 guns have been handed in (76).
The decommissioning issue was not easily compartmentalised. Instead, it had several 'hooks' which facilitated easy connection with other issues. For example, for republicans, the step from the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons to the demilitarisation of state forces was a short one. For unionists, decommissioning was best seen as a part of a continuum along which fitness to participate in constitutional politics cold be tested. According to a key Ulster Unionist negotiator, decommissioning was 'a key barometer of the commitment of the paramilitaries to the democratic process' (77). So an issue ostensibly connected with existence of illegal paramilitary weapons actually extended to issues of the political accountability of militant republicanism (78).
Having identified decommissioning as 'wedge issues', the question remains, why this issue? Why did decommissioning, rather than other issues, become a key wedge issue? Other issues, particularly politico-religious parades, did attract considerable attention. Decommissioning, however, was directly connected to political negotiations and thus the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. Yet, given that the Northern Ireland peace process was in 'dead time' for extended periods, without meaningful political negotiations, it can be argued that decommissioning was a low risk political issue. In other words, Northern Ireland's political leaders could discuss the issue in the knowledge that it would have little practical impact.
NOTES:
73 The IRA ceasefire was called in Aug 1994, followed by a loyalist ceasefire in Oct. Exploratory dialogue between British government officials and representatives of Sinn Fein and the loyalist parties did not start until Dec. These talks were joined by NIP ministers in May 1995 although Sinn Fein left these talks in the following month. Formal multi-party negotiations were not staged in Northern Ireland until June 1996, with Sinn Fein ineligible for participation because the IRA had called off its ceasefire.
74 The IRA called off its ceasefire in Feb 1996.
75 '"Shared obligation" on arms solution', Irish Times, 28 Sept, 1995.
76 David Trimble, 'Assembly may help get past arms deadlock', ibid. 2 Oct 1995
77 Author interview with a senior member of the UUP, 26 March 1996. See also
remarks by UUP MP, Ken Maginnis, in 'Sinn Fein proposals draw mixed response',
Irish Times, 12 Jan. 1996
78 Horgan (note 50) |
