Issue Hierarchies in Peace Processes: The Decommissioning of Paramilitary Arms and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Lessons for Ending Civil Conflicts
by Roger Mac Ginty
Civil Wars, Vol.1, No.3 (Autumn 1998) pp.24-45 (Published by Frank Cass)
The inflation of the decommissioning issue
Given that decommissioning became a talks entry precondition for those parties associated with paramilitary organisations, it may be unsurprising that so much attention was paid to this issue relative to other, more substantive, issues which may be dealt with in a formal talks situation. As a precondition, it was logical that decommissioning was dealt with prior to other issues. Furthermore, parties may have decided to defer raising certain issues until given the opportunity to do so in formal, structured negotiations. What is surprising, however, is the length of time which the issue of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was able to dominate the peace process. Also surprising was the extent to which it placed a block on other political developments and, to an extent, jeopardised the continuing existence of the peace process. How did this come about?
One factor which may have contributed to the ability of decommissioning to dominate other issues, was the length of time which it took for political negotiations to begin after the paramilitary ceasefires were called (73). Formal multi-party negotiations were not convened until June 1996, over a year and a half after the ceasefire declarations. This period, in which there were paramilitary ceasefires but, for variety of reasons, no formal negotiations involving the Northern Ireland parties, meant that the issue-hierarchy developed in an anarchic manner, often through the media (74). It was in this interregnum period that decommissioning emerged as a major political issue. A second factor may have been the failure of the Northern Ireland parties to agree on an agenda once multi-party talks were convened. In fact, the main point of contention in drawing up the agenda of these talks was the format in which decommissioning would be discussed. A set agenda, perhaps drawn up by an impartial talks chairperson may have helped diminish the concentration on decommissioning.
A third factor which may have contributed to the domination of the decommissioning issue in the peace process may have been that many of the discussions on the issue had little chance of actually influencing those who possessed illegal weapons. Decommissioning was variously discussed by the British and Irish governments, parliaments and civil servants, as well as by Northern Ireland's constitutional politicians. These talks were able to discuss the procedures for decommissioning and its verification. These talks were rendered somewhat academic, however, in that they were unable to progress from issues of modality to content. Furthermore, they lacked the participation of those who held the weapons.
A fourth factor may have been the sheer variety of fora in which the decommissioning issue could be discussed. It is possible to trace a progression of arenas in which the issue was raised: talks between the British and Irish governments; exploratory dialogue between the British government and those parties associated with paramilitary organisations; talks between NIP ministers and paramilitary-related political parties; 'private' bilateral talks between NIO ministers and Sinn Fein; a working party of senior British and Irish civil servants; the Independent Body on the Decommissioning of Arms; 'proximity talks' between Northern Ireland's constitutional political parties and the NIO; a Forum for Political Dialogue in Belfast; multi-party talks between Northern Ireland's parties; and direct talks between the Sinn Fein and the British Prime Minister. An overall trajectory, in which the talks progressively become more institutionalised and formal, is identifiable. This aside, however, the large number of fora in which the issue could be raised had the effect of constantly re-energising the issue and creating more media headlines. Rather than acting as an entry condition into a single set of talks, the decommissioning issue was elevated into the entry condition for several talks processes and venues.
Perhaps the most important factor in the inflation of decommissioning as
a dominant issue in the Northern Ireland peace process was its ability to
attract greater significance than the mere handing over of paramilitary
weapons. The issue became a metaphor for basic positions on the peace process
and attitudes towards political opponents. The peace process exacerbated
fears among both nationalists and unionists that they may lose out in any
change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Given the glacial
pace of political developments, many of these fears were unrealistic. But,
in a peace process, perception often matters as much as reality. It was
in this context that the issue of decommissioning attained a symbolic value.
|
