A Farewell to arms? Decommissioning and the peace process
by Colin McInnes
Parallel decommissioning, however, proved unpopular with the Unionists, who maintained their support for prior decommissioning. Nor was it embraced wholeheartedly by the Major government. In particular John Major's decision to call elections to an assembly which would in turn provide the basis for representation at the multi-party talks was seen in Dublin as an attempt by London to downplay the significance of Mitchell. More importantly the decision to call elections was the last straw for the IRA. From the Provisionals' perspective, the Major government had backtracked on its commitment in the Downing Street Declaration to allow Sinn Fein into negotiations on the sole proviso of an IRA ceasefire. With the ceasefire in place, Major had then insisted on decommissioning before Sinn Fein could participate in the talks; with the Mitchell compromise, Major had now asked for elections. This created deep distrust within the republican community over the British government's real intention. On 9 February 1996 the IRA 'with great reluctance' broke its ceasefire and exploded a bomb in London's Docklands, beginning a campaign which later escalated to Northern Ireland. Loyalist paramilitaries formally kept to their ceasefires, though the Orange Order and Apprentice Boy marches in 1996 and 1997 created a series of crises which threatened to end the entire process. As with the period before the IRA ceasefire, so the return to violence trumped the issue of decommissioning. But the failure to resolve the decommissioning issue had been a key element in the IRA's decision to recommence its bombing campaign. Despite the movement by the British government from prior to parallel decommissioning, this still fell far short of the IRA's fear that to hand in weapons before an agreement would constitute surrender. In contrast Unionists were unhappy about talking to Sinn Fein prior to decommissioning and, given the Major government's weak parliamentary position, were seen as holding considerable influence over the British government. The issue of decommissioning therefore lay at the centre of events leading up to the IRA's return to violence.
In early 1996 the Dublin government worked hard both to get a new ceasefire and to secure a date for all-part talks to begin. On the former it failed, but on 28 February it agreed with the British government that all-party talks should begin on 10 June, thereby moving from 'talks about talks' to substantive negotiations on the strands. In reality, however, there appeared to be little difference between the two since the parties concerned and the issues involved remained much the same. Rather 'talks about talks' merged into multi-party talks on the strands, with Sinn Fein banned due to the IRA's renewed campaign. Throughout 1996 and early 1997 decommissioning was somewhat in the background, at least for the two governments. The Mitchell Report had established the basis for the two governments' positions and their priority was now on obtaining a new IRA ceasefire not on further developing the decommissioning issue. But Sinn Fein was rapidly losing all confidence in the two governments and without concessions from them, particularly on decommissioning, was unlikely to push the IRA for a new ceasefire. By late 1996 the process was moribund with no real progress being made. The Major government appeared to lose its enthusiasm for Northern Ireland, frustrated over the lack of progress. In particular the prime minister, who had been instrumental in the early 1990s in securing the political will in London to advance the peace process, had become enmeshed in internal Conservative Party politics. Northern Ireland offered no solution to his more immediate problems, being at best a distraction and at worst a second front for his right wing critics to attack him on.
In the summer of 1997, new governments in London and Dublin provided the
necessary impetus to reinvigorate the peace process. On 3 June the multi-party
talks which had been suspended for the election campaign recommenced, with
the new Northern Ireland Secretary Mo Mowlam focusing on decommissioning
as the most important and sensitive issue confronting the talks. (8) On
25 June the British and Irish governments produced joint proposals on decommissioning
(including a set of 'possible conclusions' on methods of decommissioning),
(9) which although criticised by the Unionists nevertheless indicated the
two governments' intention to resolve the problem. The two governments were
also discussing the establishment of an independent body to oversee decommissioning,
as suggested by the Mitchell Report. On 26 August agreement was reached
on the establishment of an Independent International Commission on Decommissioning,
(10) with the former Canadian General and member of the Mitchell Commission
John de Chastelaine its chair. The most important event of the summer, however,
was the 19 July announcement of a second IRA ceasefire. It is clear that
the ceasefire owed much to the change in attitudes of both governments,
not least on decommissioning. Policy shifts, however, were relatively small.
This was hardly surprising - in opposition Labour had maintained a bipartisan
consensus over Northern Ireland, including support for the Mitchell Commission's
proposals on decommissioning. But within this framework the new government
appeared both intent on making progress and willing to be flexible where
possible. Perhaps the key difference was that as far as Labour was concerned,
once the IRA ceasefire had been re-established, the major stumbling block
to Sinn Fein's participation in talks was removed. On 29 August Mo Mowlam
announced that the ceasefire was indeed genuine, and on the sole proviso
that Sinn Fein formally sign up to the Mitchell Principles on democracy
and non-violence. In other words, IRA decommissioning was no longer a prerequisite
for Sinn Fein's participation in the talks, nor indeed for loyalist paramilitaries.
All that was required was a ceasefire and acceptance of the Mitchell Principles.
Sinn Fein signed up to the Mitchell Principles on 9 September at a plenary
session of the multi-party talks, with the major Unionist parties notable
by their absence. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and UK Unionists in
particular argued that the ceasefire was a 'sham' (or, less provocatively,
'tactical') and withdrew from the negotiations unless there was decommissioning
of IRA arms. Although the more moderate and larger Ulster Unionist Party
also maintained an emphasis upon decommissioning, it demonstrated a greater
willingness to compromise under its leader David Trimble, and entered into
negotiations with Sinn Fein without IRA decommissioning. |
