A Farewell to arms? Decommissioning and the peace process
by Colin McInnes
Throughout this initial period the issue of decommissioning was in the background. Priority for the two governments instead lay with obtaining paramilitary ceasefires (particularly an IRA ceasefire) and on discussions over the framework of negotiations. In contrast decommissioning received little public attention. Nevertheless the Irish government raised the issue with Sinn Fein prior to the IRA ceasefire, not least in the spring of 1993, 'Steps Envisaged' document. Irish foreign minister Dick Spring also made it clear in press briefings on the Downing Street Declaration that a permanent cessation of violence had to involve the giving up of arms, although decommissioning was not mentioned in the Declaration itself. Finally the issue may also have been discussed in the secret 'back channel' which operated at this time between the British government and Sinn Fein. However, the linkage between decommissioning and participation in negotiations was left unclear in public pronouncements.
This began to change in the second stage of the process, running from the 1994 ceasefires to the establishment of the Mitchell Commission in late 1995. During this period two sets of talks emerged. The first - the so-called 'strands' - examined future political structures in Northern Ireland and its relationship to the Republic of Ireland and the UK; the second focused on decommissioning. Crucially, in the absence of IRA decommissioning Sinn Fein was excluded from the multi-party talks on the strands. This placed decommissioning at the heart of the peace process since, without it, Sinn Fein could not participate in negotiations on political structures, thereby rendering these talks marginal. The question of when to start decommissioning weapons proved central; should it follows a political agreement, or should it precede negotiations as an indication of serious intent and to prevent the threat of a return to violence being used as leverage in talks? The British government attempted to clarify its positions on these issues when the Northern Ireland secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew, visited Washington in March 1995. Its position (expressed in what became known as the 'Washington Three') was that for Sinn Fein to join the talks the IRA had not only to indicate its willingness to disarm but to actually begin decommissioning, thereby demonstrating its commitment to peaceful means and engaging in confidence building. The 'Washington Three', however, had the effect of hardening the British government's position and turning decommissioning into the issue of the peace process, since Sinn Fein's participation was now conditional upon prior decommissioning.
Although prior decommissioning broadly satisfied unionist concerns it was unacceptable to republicans. In particular the idea of the IRA handing over its weapons to British security forces before an agreement was in place smacked of surrender. The Irish government was also beginning to suspect that the decommissioning issue was being used by London to slow progress down. This was particularly so when London's hardline position on decommissioning was coupled to the time it took to make the 'working assumption' that the IRA ceasefire was permanent and the perceived reliance of the Major government in Dublin retained its own suspicions over the IRA, it was also convinced that the IRA would not accept prior decommissioning since this would be tantamount to surrender and that as a result Sinn Fein would remain barred from the talks. A way therefore had to be found around the decommissioning problem if progress was to be made in the negotiations on the strands.
To break the growing impasse on the issue of decommissioning, in November
1995 the two governments launched the Twin Track Initiative. The first track
involved preparatory multi-party talks to establish a framework for substantive
negotiations (what became known as 'talks about talks'); the second created
an independent commission, chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell,
to examine the decommissioning of paramilitary arms. Decommissioning was
now very much centre-stage in the peace process and the issue of how to
sequence decommissioning and all-party negotiations, the biggest stumbling
to progress. The Mitchell Commission reported in January 1996 and proposed
its own solution in parallel with all-party negotiations rather than precede
or follow them (5). The Mitchell Report argued that although 'each side
of this argument [on sequencing] reflects a core of reasonable concern (6)
what was required was a compromise with each understanding that the other
had legitimate concerns. To Mitchell, holding talks and decommissioning
in parallel represented a compromise. The Report also introduced two other
key developments. The first was the articulation of what became known as
the 'Mitchell Principles' - six principles of 'democracy and non-violence'
to which all parties involved in the negotiations should 'affirm their total
and absolute commitment'. (7) Acceptance of - or 'signing up to' - the Mitchell
Principles quickly became a further prerequisite for participation in the
formal talks process. Second, the Mitchell Report for the first time publicly
addressed how decommissioning might be undertaken. Despite the significance
of decommissioning for much of 1995, no real thought had been paid to questions
relating to the process of decommissioning. Technical issues such as the
verification of terrorist arsenals, how to hand weapons in and the possibility
of prosecutions arising from weapons handed in if they had been involved
in terrorist acts had been largely ignored in favour of the more obviously
political question of when decommissioning should occur. This suggests very
strongly that decommissioning was more important for its political meaning
than for its military significance. The Mitchell Commission was the first
body publicly to provide detailed answers to the more technical questions
and its recommendations formed the basis of legislation introduced in both
the British and Irish parliaments later that year. |
