A 'most difficult and unpalatable part' - the release of politically motivated violent offenders
by Michael Von Tangen Page
This still left the problem of those prisoners from the Irish republic who did not have links with Northern Ireland. This was resolved by the Irish republic's decision to ratify the European Convention of Prisoner Transfers in November 1995. The UK had incorporated the Convention into domestic law in 1984 so there is, in theory, little reason to prevent the transfer of prisoners to the republic. However, the British government showed signs of being wary of transferring people convicted of "terrorist type" offences, and initially only Patrick Kelly, a Provisional IRA member with cancer, was transferred to the Irish republic. This attitude changed in the period after the Labour Party's general election victory of May 1997 and the resumption of the Provisional IRA ceasefire in July. The new home secretary, Jack Straw, allowed several more transfers to both the Irish republic and Northern Ireland and indicated that by the end of 1998 only one Irish prisoner convicted of a terrorist-related crime would remain in England.
The first impact of the resumption in violence on prison policy came in the Irish republic when on 10 February 1996 the government rescinded the release of nine republican prisoners who had been due to leave gaol later that day.23 In Northern Ireland the government did not make any change in penal policy but it was quite clear that further reforms were no longer on the cards. One reason why the British probably did not suspend the new remission policy was that the loyalist ceasefire was still holding and in the initial phase of the British response the maintenance of this ceasefire was of prime importance.
In June 1997 the former taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, called for further concessions by the British in the form of improved remission rates to convince the Provisional IRA that the newly elected Labour government was sincere in its commitment to include the republican movement in the talks process. While this did not occur, the new Secretary of State, Dr Marjorie Mowlam, did give the go-ahead for a series of meetings between a Sinn Féin delegation and civil servants. The meetings resulted on the 18 July 1997 in a statement from Sinn Féin's President, Gerry Adams, which called on the Provisional IRA to restore its ceasefire. In the statement Adams indicated that aside from understandings regarding the participation of Sinn Féin in political talks it was clear that "negotiations would be enhanced by specific confidence building measures". He then specifically mentioned the question of demilitarisation including the issue of prisoners as being of importance.24 Adams' statement was rapidly followed by a new ceasefire on the 20 July 1997.
While the British government did not introduce any new initiatives in the prisons after the ceasefires it did start the process towards the inclusion of Sinn Féin in the all-party negotiations at Stormont. However, over Christmas 1997-98 the prisoners again became important in Northern Ireland. After the republican ceasefire, the Irish government began a series of confidence-building measures, including the release of Provisional IRA prisoners, while the British government speeded up the transfer of prisoners from England to Northern Ireland and the Irish republic. This caused considerable disaffection amongst loyalist prisoners who felt the republican movement was achieving too many concessions whilst loyalists were being ignored. Further, during the Christmas period the INLA murdered Billy Wright, the leader of the dissident loyalist group the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) in the Maze Prison, resulting in a significant rise in sectarian tension. For a period the loyalist ceasefire hung in the balance but the secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, went into the Maze Prison and discussed the prisoners' grievances directly with them and persuaded them to reaffirm their support for the peace process.25
Dr Mowlam made it clear in a written presentation to the prisoners, published
immediately after her visit to the Maze, that the "prison issue" was part
of the wider peace process. "We recognise that prisoner issues are important to parties on both sides, They too need to be resolved ..." However, she then went on to say, "let me be clear, there will be no significant changes to release arrangements in any other context (except the success of the peace talks)". In so doing she demonstrated that the release of prisoners
would be considered but only as part of a wider political settlement of
the conflict.26 |
