A 'most difficult and unpalatable part' - the release of politically motivated violent offenders
by Michael Von Tangen Page
This pledge made it clear that the authorities at least on one level recognised the importance that prison release could have for the possible ending of violence. Indeed it is interesting to note that according to the former taoiseach, Dr Garrett Fitzgerald, the UK government had considered offering the early release of paramilitary prisoners if political violence came to an end as early as 1985, during the negotiations with Dublin that led to the Anglo-Irish Agreement.12
In October 1995, the government moved the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Bill that restored a form of 50 per cent remission to the 417 scheduled prisoners who had since 1989 only received remission of one-third of their sentences. While this would result in about 90 paramilitary prisoners being released in 1995, amounting to about a tenth of the approximately 900 paramilitary prisoners held in Northern Ireland at that time, the reaction of republicans was negative.13 Sinn Féin's prison policy spokesperson, Pat McGeown, told The Times that 50 per cent remission would have "little or no impact in terms of reducing the numbers of political prisoners in British gaols either in the next twelve months or indeed by the year 2000".14
According to the secretary of state Sir Patrick Mayhew the decision to introduce the change in the remission procedure was made possible by the fact that the ceasefires had held for over a year and that the risk of further attacks by the paramilitaries had greatly decreased. He included an important safeguard in the policy - release on licence. Rather than simply change the remission rate back to 50 per cent, which would have resulted in automatic release of prisoners after half the sentence had been served, one-third remission was retained with the remainder of the period up to the 50 per cent level being a licence period. In this period, a person could be re-imprisoned if his or her behaviour had not been good. In the debate, Mayhew made clear that he interpreted this as meaning that if the prisoner re-offended (as with all prisoners released on remission) or he was convinced that they represented a danger to the public, then the prisoner would return to gaol.15
This concession resulted in the sceptical support of the Unionist parties for the policy. The Labour Party supported the move but some opposition MPs were worried about the nature of the licence and the role that this created for the secretary of state without some form of judicial procedure. The largest nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), was also unenthusiastic about the Bill but supported the idea of the release, even though it represented less than had existed between 1979 and 1989.16
The broad acceptance of the Bill meant that in November 1995 88 prisoners were released.17 While the releases had been intended to help the peace process, the situation outside the prisons had deteriorated at that stage, due to the political difficulties in starting all-party talks. The delay in finding a compromise over the issue of the decommissioning of paramilitary arms prior to the commencement of talks caused considerable republican frustration. On 9 February 1996 a large bomb exploded in London's Docklands area.18 This was followed by other Provisional IRA bombs in England and Germany and eventually the resumption of its campaign in Northern Ireland.
Outside Northern Ireland, the transfer of Irish prisoners in British gaols
to the prison systems in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic was a cause
of discontent. The issue was resolved by a change in policy at the Home
Office. Over 40 prisoners were granted "temporary extended" transfers to
Northern Irish prisons in line with the recommendations of the 1992 "Ferrers Report".19 The Report argued that people should be transferred to prisons
as close to their relatives as possible.20 Temporary extended transfers
gave the families better access but ensured that the prisoners were still
under the control of the home secretary. However, there were complaints
about the slow introduction of the new policy. The home secretary, Michael
Howard, was accused of being unwilling to approve the transfers of the prisoners
back to Ireland for political reasons.21 However, according to The Sunday
Times, the opposition also came from the former primer minister, Baroness
Thatcher, whose personal intervention with her successor John Major had
stopped the first planned transfers in February 1993.22 Ultimately, however,
after a dirty protest by some republican prisoners at Whitemoor Prison,
the policy was implemented. |
