Patterns of Policing and Policing Patten
By Paddy Hillyard & Mike Tomlinson
From: Journal of Law and Society Vol.27. No.3. September 2000 (Blackwell Publishers)
The Police (Northern Ireland) Bill
By the time the Police Bill was published, few commentators anticipated that there would be further dilution of the PCR' proposals. The Bill, however, does more than water down: it completely rejects the PCR's core project. It refers throughout to the police 'force' and consolidates further the traditional centralised authoritarian tripartite model of policing. The Police Board will have less power than the existing Police Authority which PANI itself has described as 'ludicrous and totally unacceptable'.(63) The PCR's structure of a central Police Board and district partnerships is retained, but both levels are stripped of effective powers and many democratic elements are neutralised.
Although the Police Board will have a majority of political members, it will not be able to elect its own chair. The Secretary of State will appoint not only the independent members, but also the chair, and is only required to 'consult' with the First and Deputy First Minister over the latter. The Board may 'call upon' the chair and other senior officers to retire 'in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness',(64) but only with approval of the Secretary of State, and it is not clear what happens if the call is not answered. The Board's decisions will be subject to majority voting for the most part, but in one crucial area - a decision to hold an inquiry - at least twelve members must be present and vote in favour.(65)
The Bill disqualifies anyone convicted of a terrorist offence from serving as an independent member on District Policing Partnerships.(66) This is especially relevant in Belfast City where Sinn Fein has the largest number of councillors alongside the Ulster Unionist Party, and in the West of the city where Sinn Fein has a clear majority. West Belfast was due to have its own DPP but in the Bill, the number and territory of the Belfast DPPs is left to the Chief Constable to determine.(67) District councils will be permitted to amalgamate in order to create a larger unit for Partnership purposes, a facility only likely to be of interest to unionist councils seeking to bolster the position of neighbouring unionist minority council. It will be up to regulations developed under the auspices of the Secretary of State to spell out whether the meetings of Partnerships or the Board will take place in public.
The Bill proposes an elaborate obstacle course which has to be run if the Board wishes to exercise its most important powers - to require the Chief Constable to present a report on a specific policy issue or policing incident, and the power to cause an injury to be held. The course begins with achieving a majority on the Board itself to request a report from the Chief Constable,(68) by no means a foregone conclusion. Hurdle number two comes in the shape of the Chief Constable deciding if the requested report would contain information which ought not to be disclosed on one of five grounds. These include 'national security' (a somewhat one-sided legal concept in circumstances when it is precisely 'the nation' which is at issue), because it is of a 'sensitive personal nature', or is being investigated by a statutory authority (including the police), or it would be prejudicial to court proceedings, or, finally, because 'it would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime, the apprehension or prosecution of offenders of the administration of justice (our emphasis).'(69) Effectively, the police could stifle any request by saying they are already investigating the matter themselves. Whatever is decided at this stage, the next obstacle is the Secretary of State who must confirm the Board's requirement to report.
If a report is eventually made under Section 55 the Board 'may' arrange
to publish it, but is not obliged to do so. Then the Board can move on to
initiating an inquiry. It is obliged (s. 56(1)) to consult with the Chief
Constable before doing so. On this occasion at least twelve Board members
present at a meeting must support the call for an inquiry as we have seen.
The Chief Constable and Secretary of State must be informed and the Secretary
of State sent a copy of the report on which the inquiry call is based. The
Board then has to repeat the loop of having its request vetted by the Chief
Constable against the checklist of the same five reasons used in the case
of reports. Since an inquiry finding has potentially more impact than a
report finding, the thresholds are likely to be tougher in this round. Once
again, the Secretary of State has the final decision as to whether to run
with the Board's request or not. We then come to what might be called the
'Stalker clause'.(70) The Secretary of State can re-run the five-item checklist
both to determine than an inquiry be held or not and to discontinue an inquiry
which is already in progress. The Secretary of State is furthermore empowered
to reject or discontinue an inquiry if it 'would not be in the interests
of the efficiency or effectiveness of the police force.'(71) The Secretary
of State has to confirm any request to a specific person (or office) to
conduct an inquiry - the police Ombudsman, the Inspector of Constabulary,
the Comptroller and Auditor General, or any other person. |
