The Assembly and the Executive
by Rick Wilford
From: Aspects of the Belfast Agreement edited by Rick Wilford
Oxford University Press 2001
Monitoring the 'Centre'
No provision, however, was made in the Agreement or the Act for the Office of the First and Deputy First Ministers, the 'Office of the Centre' as it was subsequently designated, to be subject to scrutiny by a statutory committee. This omission provoked considerable controversy within the shadow Assembly and was to spill over into its devolved phase between 2 December 1999 and 11 February 2000. Given the multidimensional nature of the Office and its role as the key co-ordinating department, MLAs were concerned that it should be made fully accountable to the Assembly. To that end, during the shadow phase, the all-party Committee on Standing Orders - itself jointly chaired by a unionist and a nationalist - made provision for a 'Committee on Conformity with Equality Requirements' (CCER) to scrutinise the management of the 'Equality Unit' that was to be located within the Office. However, following the devolution of powers, on 6 December 1999, the Standing Orders Committee revisited the matter. It tabled two motions, duly endorsed by the Assembly, proposing in the stead of CCER, two new standing committees: 'Equality, Human Rights and Community Relations' and 'European Affairs'. A week later, David Ford, (Alliance Party) moved a new standing order to create a third standing committee to examine and report on the remaining functions carried out by the Office of the Centre. However, the First and Deputy First Ministers tabled an amendment to the motion, seeking to revoke the creation of the two new committees and replace them with a single 'Committee of the Centre'. The purpose of the joint motion was to insulate some aspects of the Office's - and the Executive Committee's - work against the focused scrutiny of an Assembly committee.
It is essential that discussions which take place in determining the decisions reached by the Executive Committee or the negotiating position for the Northern Ireland Administration in relation to the North/South Ministerial Council or the British-Irish Council should remain private. (Northern Ireland Assembly Reports, 14 December 1999)
The shared view of Mallon and Trimble was that such matters, more particularly those pertaining to Strands Two and Three, were more properly dealt with on the floor of the Assembly rather than in the close confines of a committee room. However, their motion drew stiff opposition from among others Sinn Fein, the DUP, Progressive Unionists, and the Women's Coalition, each concerned at the limited scope of the proposed committee. Nevertheless, the combined weight of the UUP and SDLP MLAs assured a sufficient level of cross community support for the Trimble/Mallon motion to succeed. Thus, where there were two, and potentially three, Assembly committees to scrutinise the Office of the Centre, now there was one enjoying a narrow remit.
This episode was instructive in a number of respects. First, it demonstrated
the readiness of rival parties to act in a common cause - in this case,
to further provide for the kind of executive-legislative partnership that
was intended for the other departments and the Assembly's statutory committees.
Secondly, and perhaps more ominously, it demonstrated the capacity of the
Trimble/Mallon dyarchy to mobilise their Assembly parties in order to free
their hands - as well as those of their Executive colleagues - to deal with
a range of strategic issues, especially in relation to north-south matters.
Such mobilisation confirmed a growing suspicion among the other parties
that a UUP/SDLP duopoly was emerging at the heart of the administration
which was at odds with the inclusivity of the Agreement's basic design.
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