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20 February 2015
The Good Friday Agreement

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The Nature of Devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland: Key Issues of Responsibility and Control

by Brigid Hadfield

The provisions relating to overriding powers of dissolution and prorogation as originally conceived should be understood in the context of the requirements of the Northern Ireland Act on the formation of the Executive. It is in this regard that the comparison between Scotland and Northern Ireland is most stark. Section 16 requires first, that a First Minister (FM) and Deputy First Minister (DFM) (each candidate for either office standing for election jointly with a candidate for the other office) (71) shall be elected by the Assembly from among its members, on a cross community vote. That is, those elected must secure a majority of the members voting in the election, a majority of the designated Nationalists voting and a majority of the designated Unionists voting (72). Neither FM nor DFM can take up office until he or she affirms the terms of the pledge of office which is found in Sch 4 to the Act (reproducing word for word the pledge as contained in the Belfast Agreement). The FM and DFM are then required to submit to the Assembly for its approval on a cross community vote their determination as to the number of Ministers and their functions. The number of Ministers is not to exceed ten unless the Secretary of State by order (73) provides for a greater number. The Ministerial positions are then allocated in accordance with the d'Hondt formula (74) which ensures proportionality in the allocation of those positions on the basis of the number of seats a party has secured in the Assembly elections. The formula is in essence; the number of Assembly seats held by the party (as determined at the day on which the Assembly first meets following its election) divided by the number of Ministerial offices (if any) held by that party plus one. The party which receives the Ministerial office at that time chooses the department he or she (or the party) desires, leaving the remaining departments to those who are successful in the order of their success. A Northern Ireland Minister shall not take up office until he or she has affirmed the terms of the pledge of office. There is no requirement of an oath of allegiance to the Queen --hardly surprising in the context of Northern Ireland and a power sharing government (75). Where all Ministers cease to hold office, the d'Hondt formula is then re-run on the basis of the state of the parties on the day on which the Assembly first met following its election (76). It should be noted that under the legislation a party is not likely, during the life of the Assembly, to lose seats electorally, as vacancies are expected to be filled by substitutes rather than through by-elections. The number of seats held, therefore, can only be altered by defections. The 'opposition' to individual members of the Executive Committee is most likely to come from the shadow committees which s 29 of the Act requires the Assembly to establish. The d'Hondt formula also applies to the appointment of committee chairs and deputy chairs (the formula being run without Ministerial posts being included). The section requires standing orders to provide that a Minister may not be the chair or deputy chair of a statutory committee and also to require a nominating party 'to prefer a committee' in which there is no party interest. A party interest in a committee is defined by s 29(6) as arising where the committee is established 'to advise and assist a Northern Ireland Minister who is a member of (that) party'.

No Minister (77) holds office at Her Majesty's pleasure and therefore, they are not (even theoretically) thus dismissable. Two issues thus arise here. The first concerns the 'collective' nature of the Northern Ireland Executive. Paragraph 19 of Strand 1 of the Belfast Agreement states that the Executive Committee

Will provide a forum for the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, for prioritising executive and legislative proposals and for recommending a common position where necessary (e.g. in dealing with external relationships).

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