3.2 Nothing New Under the Sun:
Strategy 2010 in Perspective
2. How did political and economic change during the 1955-99 period influence the documents?
Unsurprisingly they were coloured by the development of the Troubles after 1969. The documents in the early 1970s give the impression of fire fighting. The later documents tended to treat a certain level of violence and instability as a regrettable "given". Strategy 2010 does not spell out whether its success is critically dependent on the success of the current peace process.
The reports were undoubtedly somewhat influenced by the political master who had commissioned them. For example, Isles and Cuthbert writing for the unionist Stormont government of the 1950s endorse the UK as a political and economic union whereas Strategy 2010 is much more compatible with the lines of much Anglo-Irish diplomacy post-1985 since it portrays NI as a somewhat free-floating region relating sometimes to London, and sometimes Dublin or even Brussels.
3. Does comparison with the earlier documents indicate anything regarding the likelihood of success of Strategy 2010?
It can do. Kingon (1999), although a member of the Steering Group of Strategy 2010 noted that "every single economic development strategy for NI in living memory has failed to meet its own targets. With the exception of export growth targets, virtually no target in 30 years has been met".
NIEC (1999a) noted that some of the central aims of Strategy 2010 were present in DED (1987, 1990, 1995). For example; reduction in the total industrial grants to the same firms, and a re-balancing of grants away from capital and towards R and D, marketing, management and training development NIEC (1999a) suggests a disappointing record during 1991-97 in realising these objectives. The implication is that it is one thing to devise an economic policy and quite another whether it is actually implemented.
Will Strategy 2010 be any different? NIEC (1999b) provides a critical assessment. Strategy 2010 has set itself the goal of raising NI's comparative GDP her head to 90 per cent of the UK level by 2010. A worthy objective but one unlikely to be realised given that the strategy document has no clear economic model, indicates no baseline projections as to what would happen in the absence of implementation of the strategy and, in most cases, fails to demonstrate connections between the strategy's recommendations and it goals. Fundamentally, realisation of the objective of GDP per capita of 90 per cent of the UK level will require considerable improvement in NI's comparative productivity. For most sectors throughout the 1920s-90s period the extent of sustained productivity convergence with the UK has been limited (Hitchens and Birnie, 1994; Birnie and Hitchens, 1999).
5. Conclusion
In assessing the likely impact of Strategy 2010 it is worth remembering that the effectiveness of the previous ten documents was limited because none of them had the advantage of all of the following:
(i) Some degree of input to the document which is external to NI and/or
based on relevant economic theories
(ii) Favourable state of the world economy
(iii) Peace and stability in NI
(iv) Sufficient political will in Belfast and/or London to fully implement
the document's proposals
(v) A sufficient capacity amongst NI's private sector (particularly management) to rise to the challenge posed by the document.
There still are doubts relating to all five of these points with respect to Strategy 2010. To recognise this is not to engage in criticism for criticism's sake but to be properly realistic. Admittedly, even under the best of conditions economic policy makers in NI would have little influence over point (ii), and only a partial impact on (iii), but they may be able to do something in terms of the remaining three points.
It is notable that both Isles and Cuthbert (1957) and DED (1990) gave some attention to the comparative quality of NI's management. This implies that the NI economy has a longstanding supply side difficulty in this regard (this has been confirmed by analysis of the substantial shortfall in NI's manufacturing productivity throughout the 1920s-90s period (Hitchens, Wagner and Birnie, 1990; Birnie and Hitchens, 1999). NI's supply side and particularly its management may not be capable of implementing the 60-plus recommendations of Strategy 2010.
Attempts by policy makers to exhort them to do so may be the equivalent, to adapt Keynes' expression, of pushing on a piece of string. The incremental implementation of Strategy 2010 which has occurred since the spring of 1999 would be greatly strengthened by a microeconomic research and action plan which would consider the state of NI's management in terms of its strategies and competencies compared to international counterparts and then attempted to follow best practice.
References
Birnie, J.E and Hitchins, D.M.W.N. (1999), Northern Ireland Economy: Performance,
Prospects, policy, Ashgate, London.
Bradley, J and Hamilton, D (1999) "Strategy 2010 Report by the Economic Development Strategy Review Group on Northern Ireland: A critical evaluation",
Paper, Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin.
Crafts, N.F.R (1995) "The Golden Age of economic growth in postwar Europe: Why did Northern Ireland miss?", Irish Economic and Social History. Vol
XXII, pp5-25.
Gillespie, A (1999) "Strategy 2010: Serious Scrutiny recommended", Economic
Outlook and Business Review, vol 14, no2, pp35-42.
Hitchens , D.M.W.N. and Birnie, J.E. (1994), The Competitiveness of Industry
in Ireland, Avebury, Aldershot.
Kingon, S (1999), "Time for radical change", Ulster Business, vol 9, no4,
April, pp 52-53
NIEC (1999a), "The implementation of Northern Ireland's development strategy in the 1990s, Lessons for the future", Report no 131, Northern Ireland Economic Council, Belfast. NIEC (1999b), "A step-change in economic performance", Occasional Paper, no12, Northern Ireland Economic Council, Belfast.
Footnotes
1. Thought Professor Wilson is of NI origin.
2. Wilson submitted his report in December 1994. It was then accepted by
the NI Government and published along with a Government statement in early
1965.
3. Two of these were women: Dr A McGinley and T Townley. They were also
the only women amongst all the main authors of the various reports since
1955. During the 1955-99 period the female proportion of the NI employed
labour force increased from just over one-third to just under one-half.
4. Shorts-Bombardier (aerospace) and Viridian (electricity).
5. Though Wilson has told the authors that he now wishes had had been allowed
a longer period to draw up his report which would have provided the opportunity
for wider consultation.
6. This is not to say that attempts were not made to involve the economic
partners in the implementation of the strategies.
7. This was certainly the view of Bradley and Hamilton (1999). The document
itself describes the Steering Group as, "largely private sector", which
is a curious description given that only six out of the 13 members were
clearly from the private sector. |
