Peace agreements and human rights by Christine Bell
Oxford University Press 2000
Similarly however, in debating whether to enter talks, Unionists reframed their claim in self-determination terms. Rather than frame their claim purely in terms of democratic majoritarianism (and count on the majority being a Protestant one), Unionists began to adopt the term 'consent', claiming that Unionists should not be forced into a form of government or a different state against their freely determined choice. This in essence reframed their claim as that of a distinctive group to a form of self-determination. They simultaneously used international instruments to argue for an internal solution. In particular Ulster Unionists made reference to C/OSCE standards, taking comfort from their references to 'the integrity of borders.'v But this was not without consequence. Along with territorial integrity these standards also promoted human rights protections and robust minority rights. Arguably, international law played some part in moving key Ulster Unionist elites to a position where they accepted that affirmation of Northern Ireland's legitimacy as a political entity could be secured by conceding increased human rights protection and even group rights. International legal standards also gave progressive Unionists a tool for engaging in internal negotiation with more traditional party members, who saw Unionism's claims as claims to a Unionist nation-state, rather than to pluralism. Under this traditional view Northern Ireland is comprised of loyal British Citizens, and those who dissent from this position constitute the disloyal 'other', whose disloyalty cannot be accommodated, and who do not therefore register as a relevant part of the polity.vi International human rights standards reveal this position as illegitimate and movement from this position could therefore be argued by liberal Unionists to be internationally necessary rather than (merely) a concession to Nationalists or Republicans.
The Framework Convention was of course a child of CSCE documents and therefore also relevant. It was only in January 1997 that the British government exhibited a serious intent to bring the talks to an end-game by publishing the heads of agreement documents. Interestingly, this was also the month in which they ratified the Framework Convention, despite the fact that British governments had traditionally denied the need for minority rights, on the grounds that protection for individual rights was sufficient.vii Indeed, one Ulster Unionist Party politician has claimed in private that ratification took place on their insistence. To the extent that Unionists used the Convention, it was to claim that it underwrote the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland. But of course the Convention also refers to cross-border linkages and rights to effective participation in all aspects of public life. Unionists insisted that cross-border linkages were purely cultural and did not imply any 'right' to executive power for a neighbouring state with a kin group, such as was being contemplated in the North/South cross-border bodies. Yet it does seem that when a crucial Republican/Unionist log jam over the role and scope of cross-border bodies was reached, discussion of Framework Convention requirements came into play. However, when the Belfast Agreement approach to internal self-determination is viewed as a package, it can also be argued that it develops, rather than jettisons, the traditional UK approach to self-determination.viii
International law also, of course, affected the other human rights aspects
of the Agreement, such as Bill of Rights, policing and criminal justice
provision, equality and the mechanisms for enforcement.ix While this will
be dealt with more fully in the next chapter, it is worth pointing out one
interesting dynamic. The articulation of rights protection as flowing from
international law commitments rather than just the history of the conflict,
opened up arguments for Southern Irish government reciprocity which were
difficult to resist. The Agreement ultimately included an overarching commitment
to 'ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as
will pertain in Northern Ireland' and to consider incorporating the European
Convention on Human Rights, the establishment of a Human Rights Commission
in the Republic of Ireland, and provision for an all-Ireland Charter of
Rights.x This came about as a result of a common interest of Republicans
and Unionists, based paradoxically in their entirely different self-determination
perspectives. While Republicans saw mutuality in rights protection as part
of the all-Ireland dimension, Unionists saw it as saying, 'if you're going
to shove this down our throats you're going to have it as well.'xi |
