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20 February 2015
The Good Friday Agreement

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Unionist Politics by Feargal Cochrane

Cork University Press 2001

The UUP slogan of 'no guns, no government' was turning into exactly that. The proposed deadline for the Executive 'going live' (10 March) came and went without agreement. This was knocked back by Secretary of State Mo Mowlam until the 'natural deadline' of the week beginning on 29 March, the week of Good Friday. This was a case of déj&aagrave; vu for the peace process, as Prime Minister Tony Blair and Taoiseach Bertie Ahern dutifully arrived to hold the hands and twist arms of the protagonists. While Blair had talked famously a year earlier about feeling the 'hand of history on our shoulders', one commentator remarked cheekily that this time around it was more a case of 'a finger of fudge'. 30 The fudge being attempted on this occasion was one that had underpinned the whole Agreement, namely, how to find a form of words over decommissioning that would keep the UUP on board and allow the political process to move forward into the implementation stage. These discussions resulted in the Hillsborough Declaration on 1 April. The key points in the declaration related to what was now being called the choreography of 'jumping together' on the issues that divided the pro-Agreement unionists and Sinn Féin. The document suggested that while decommissioning was not a precondition of the Agreement, it was an 'obligation'. It also proposed that on a predetermined date, nominations would take place, under the d'Hondt procedure, of ministers for the Executive, after which a collective act of reconciliation would take place that 'will see some arms put beyond use on a voluntary basis'. The Hillsborough Declaration was initially welcomed by UUP leader David Trimble as having the 'potential' to resolve unionist concerns over decommissioning. Others within his party were less sanguine, however, with Jeffrey Donaldson declaring that its language was 'decidedly woolly'. The DUP suggested that the Declaration was simply a form of words that would achieve little in practise and did not provide any greater guarantee of decommissioning than did the Agreement itself. Sinn Féin, on the other hand, were incensed by the Hillsborough Declaration and believed that the British and Irish governments had caved in to unionist pressure and had effectively re-negotiated the terms of the Agreement. Sinn Féin's chief negotiator in the 1998 talks, Martin McGuinness, summed up the republican mood when he declared that 'I don't believe the IRA are going to jump to any ultimatum issued by David Trimble or those elements within the British military establishment.' 31 Sinn Féin chairperson Mitchel McLaughlin stated that the Declaration was 'an attempt to rewrite important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement, especially the decommissioning section so that the establishment of the institutions are on unionist terms. This is an unacceptable departure from the commitments given on Good Friday 1998.' 32 The consequence of the Hillsborough Declaration was that it alienated republicans who felt that it had moved the goalposts on decommissioning, while not impressing sceptical unionists that any substantive guarantees had been provided. It was back to the drawing board and more talks for the two governments. Eventually, following another marathon session of meetings, the British government set a deadline of 30 June for the full devolution of powers to Northern Ireland. The statement, prepared at a meeting between the two governments and major parties on 14 May, was notable for the fact that despite its positive tone, no specific commitments over weapons decommissioning were required before the formation of the Executive was to commence. The key passage in the 14 May document reads as follows: All parties agree to the full implementation of all aspects of the Good Friday Agreement including the objective of achieving total disarmament and complete withdrawal of all weapons from politics in Ireland. They accept the issue of arms must be finally and satisfactorily settled and will do what they can to achieve decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within the time-frame set down in the Agreement, in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement. The International Commission on Decommissioning will now begin a period of intensive discussions with all parties and report back on progress before 30 June. All parties anticipate, without prejudice to their clear positions on this issue, a devolution of powers by 30 June.33 Unionists were upset that this had fudged the decommissioning issue.

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