The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
by Stephen Livingstone
From Fordham International Law Journal Vol.22, April 1999 No.4
B. The Role of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights
By the early 1970s the need for constitutional change in Northern Ireland was clear. Critics argued that such human rights abuses, notably in the spheres of religious discrimination and the abuse of police powers, were at the root of the developing social unrest which gripped Northern Ireland in this period.1 Moreover it was argued that there was a lack of sufficient legal or institutional protection for human rights in Northern Ireland, with the courts having shown themselves unwilling or unable to intervene.2 As a means of rectifying this deficit several of Northern Ireland's political parties advocated the passing of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, which would entrench certain human rights guarantees in Northern Irish law.3 However this proved too radical for the British government of the day, which took the view that developing such a measure would raise too many problems as to what rights should be enshrined and what tribunal should be responsible for their interpretation and application.4 Instead the government put forward proposals for a Commission which would be "charged with the duty of keeping in touch with the activities of all public agencies in the field of human rights and of producing an annual report, including recommendations as to any further statutory provision which it considers should be made".5
However by the time the proposals made it into legislative form they were considerably narrowed and Section 20(1) of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 merely provided that the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR) would have two purposes
(a) Advising the Secretary of State on the Adequacy and effectiveness of the law for the time being in force in preventing discrimination on the grounds of religious belief or political opinion and in providing redress for persons aggrieved by discrimination on either ground.
(b) Keeping the Secretary of State informed as to the extent to which the persons, authorities and bodies mentioned in section 19(1) [public authorities]6 have prevented discrimination on either ground by persons or bodies not prohibited from discriminating by that law.
Thus while SACHR's name suggested it was a general human rights commission
its statutory mandate limited it to consideration of discrimination on the
grounds of religion or political opinion. Although, as we shall see below,
the Commission was able to widen the range of matters it considered, the
narrowness of the formal mandate was a matter for constant dispute with
the government7 and was one of the ways in which the Commission's legal
basis inhibited its effectiveness. Another was the lack of powers given
to the Commission even to achieve its task of ensuring the law was adequate
to prevent discrimination on the grounds of religion or political opinion.
SACHR was to be very much an advisory body to government. It had no powers
to receive individual complaints, initiate or assist litigants, conduct
investigations into alleged human rights abuses or examine draft legislation
for compliance with human rights standards. In addition to being hindered
as regards effectiveness, SACHR would always face a struggle to establish
its independence from government as its (part-time) members were all appointed
by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.8 These members were in turn
heavily dependent on the Commission's full time staff, most of who were
directly seconded from government departments.9 In addition to problems
with regard to effectiveness and independence SACHR came to operate in a
very different political context than that it was designed for. When it
was established in 1973 it was envisaged that it would operate in the context
of a new Northern Irish parliament and executive as provided for in the
Sunningdale Agreement. However these institutions were to collapse in early
1974 and for the remainder of its history SACHR found itself dealing only
with a British government which had assumed full executive and legislative
authority over Northern Ireland. Although that British government's policy
was far from consistent over the next twenty-five years, a recurrent theme
was the need for strong anti-terrorist measures.10 As a result while the
Secretary of State dutifully laid SACHR's annual reports before Parliament
only one of them was ever debated and many of SACHR's recommendations, especially
in respect of emergency powers, fell on deaf ears. |
